Jordan's Accession to the WTO: Retrospective and Prospective by Malkawi, Bashar H.
www.ssoar.info
Jordan's Accession to the WTO: Retrospective and
Prospective
Malkawi, Bashar H.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Malkawi, B. H. (2010). Jordan's Accession to the WTO: Retrospective and Prospective. The Estey Journal of
International Law and Trade Policy, 11(1), 12-45. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-64222-3
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Vo lume  11  Number  1  2010 /p .  1 2 -45  es tey j ou rn a l . com 
 
Editorial Office: 410 22nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. 
Phone (306) 244-4800; Fax (306) 244-7839; email: kerr.w@esteycentre.com 1 
 
 
 
Jordan’s Accession to the WTO: 
Retrospective and Prospective 
Bashar H. Malkawi1  
Associate Professor of Law, the Hashemite University, Jordan   
Jordan acceded to the WTO in 1999. In its accession Jordan agreed, for example, to 
reduce tariffs on imported products and open its services market; it also modified its 
intellectual property regime. Jordan enjoyed special and differential treatment in few 
areas and was not able to designate olive oil as a good eligible for special safeguards. 
The WTO agreements required fundamental changes in the domestic laws and 
regulations of Jordan. The article concludes by arguing that Jordan’s accession to the 
WTO was a lengthy and costly process. Jordan agreed to an arduous package of legal 
and economic reforms. Given that Jordan agreed to greater commitments compared to 
the obligations of the original WTO members, the multilateral trading system 
witnessed an accession saga. 
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Introduction 
s a young democracy and fledgling market economy, Jordan’s government has 
pursued policies designed to strengthen its economy. The cornerstone of the 
government’s long-term economic objectives has been to increase trade and support 
economic growth via regional and global integration. Accordingly, Jordan actively 
pursued World Trade Organization membership. 
This article’s ultimate goal is not historical. Arab countries are attempting to 
broaden their engagement in the multilateral trading system in a manner that has many 
implications. Not only have some Arab countries either acceded to or entered the 
pipeline of acceding to the WTO, but also their new commitments coincide with 
reorientations in their economic strategies. Thus, Jordan’s accession to the WTO 
serves as an ideal case study for other Arab countries contemplating acceding to the 
WTO.2  
Membership, however, has not come without sacrifice. WTO accession was a 
lengthy and difficult process. The purpose of this article is to examine the major 
commitments Jordan undertook in its accession. The article outlines the accession 
framework and the political and economic factors that induced Jordan to accede to the 
WTO. It goes on to examine some of Jordan’s specific WTO accession commitments 
and an array of issues raised during the accession. The article also takes into account 
and evaluates the trade policy review of Jordan conducted in 2008. In conclusion, the 
article argues that Jordan agreed to an arduous package of legal and economic 
reforms. Given that Jordan agreed to greater commitments compared to the 
obligations of the original WTO members, the multilateral trading system witnessed 
an accession saga. 
The Mechanics of the WTO Accession Process 
Before the WTO came into existence, a country became a contracting party to the 
GATT through the full accession procedure under article XXXIII and the sponsorship 
procedure under article XXVI.3 Article XXXIII provided the general framework for 
accession to the GATT and established the process of accession for countries that are 
not founding members of the GATT. Article XXVI.5 (c) of the GATT created a 
different procedure of accession for customs territories that have gained full autonomy 
in the conduct of their external commercial relations.4 An existing contracting party 
that has been responsible for the customs territory can sponsor it for membership.5 
Most Arab countries acceded to the GATT through the sponsorship procedure.6 For 
example, if England had sponsored Jordan, Jordan would have been a contracting 
party to the GATT. Article XVII of GATT 1994, which refers to state monopolies, also 
A 
 Bashar H. Malkawi 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  
provided the basis for accession of countries with centrally planned economies.7 
Jordan also could have used this provision for its accession given its interventionist 
trade policy. 
Now, article XII of the WTO Charter, which echoes article XXXIII of the GATT, 
governs the WTO accession process.8 The WTO accession process is based on a case-
by-case methodology. The accession process begins with an official notification to the 
office of the Director-General of the WTO of the intention to join by the country in 
question.9 Any application for accession must first be approved informally by the 
General Council. Thereafter, the General Council formally establishes a working party 
of countries that are interested in evaluating the application.10 The working party and 
the acceding country engage in round(s) of questions and answers in writing before 
the first meeting of the working party. After basic policies have been sorted out with 
the working party, interested WTO members enter into bilateral negotiations with the 
applicant over specific commitments that are prerequisites to joining the WTO. Once 
the bilateral negotiations are finalized, bilateral concession agreements are drafted. 
The best concessions for market access in goods and services obtained in the bilateral 
negotiations process extend to all other WTO members.11 
Jordan wanted to become a WTO member for many reasons. Accession to the 
GATT/WTO would mean Jordan’s exports would be subject to lower tariffs and other 
trade barriers. Consumers would enjoy a wide variety of products.12 Jordan would be 
considered on the same footing as any other member of the WTO and would avoid 
becoming isolated in its relations with other countries, an important consideration in 
an increasingly interrelated world. It was prestigious for Jordan, as an Arab country, to 
accede to the WTO, especially in the Arab region, where WTO membership or 
effective participation in the WTO has been the exception rather than the rule. 
Jordan started negotiations to join the GATT in January 1994. In 1995, after the 
WTO was established, Jordan’s application was transferred to a WTO working party.13 
At this time, Jordan imposed a self-declared deadline of 1999 for accession. The 1999 
deadline was prescribed because 1999 was the year that the WTO would launch the 
“Millennium Round” at the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference. Jordan wanted to 
accede by 1999 because the Millennium Round would raise the bar to accede and the 
terms of entry would become enormous. It was felt that the sooner Jordan acceded to 
the WTO the earlier it could have a say in future trade rounds. 
Many Arab countries, including Egypt, Kuwait, and Morocco, urged other WTO 
members to accept Jordan at an earlier point in time. Additionally, the United States 
supported Jordan’s accession to the WTO. The lifting of Jordan from the U.S. watch 
list of countries that do not adequately protect intellectual property rights also 
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provided momentum for Jordan’s accession.14 It was anticipated that Jordan’s 
accession package would be ratified during the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the 
WTO.15 However, the meeting was interrupted and the approval was delayed. The 
General Council voted for Jordan’s accession package on December 17, 1999. Jordan 
became a member on April 11, 2000.16 Thus, Jordan met its self-imposed deadline for 
accession to the WTO. The following section discusses Jordan’s commitments in its 
accession to the WTO. 
Protocol of Accession and WTO Commitments 
Jordan agreed to a broad range of obligations in areas such as tariff reductions, 
services, agriculture, and transparency. It is beyond the scope of this article to give a 
comprehensive analysis of the various commitments Jordan undertook. It will suffice 
to examine Jordan’s major obligations in its accession to the WTO, the current status 
of implementation of these obligations, and the issues of concern that have surfaced 
related to Jordan’s WTO membership. 
A. Market Access in Goods 
1. Tariff Reduction 
When a country joins the WTO it enjoys market access rights, i.e., entry and exit. 
In return, an acceding country must offer equivalent market access concessions. For 
purposes of tariff reduction, products and their tariff lines are grouped together into 
several categories, in what can be seen as a sectoral approach.17 Jordan made 
substantial market access commitments as part of its WTO membership negotiations.18 
Jordan has low average tariffs, with single- or two-digit rates, ad valorem–only duties 
with some exceptions where specific duties apply, and nearly 100 percent tariff 
bindings.19 Jordan may have binding overhangs – the difference between bound tariff 
rates and applied tariff rates – in its tariff schedule.20 To deal with sensitivities in tariff 
reduction, Jordan was granted staging and product-exclusion rights.21 As Jordan has a 
lengthened implementation period for tariff reductions, the country made some degree 
of cuts in tariff rates several months after the date of accession, which had the effect 
of securing for WTO countries some immediate tangible results from the negotiations. 
Since, Jordan has acceded to the 1997 WTO Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), it has committed itself to reduce tariffs to zero, and it has bound tariffs at that 
level on IT products.22 In other words, computer and computer-related products, 
including semi-conductor chips, are not subject to tariffs. Since Jordan is not a major 
exporter of IT products, the ITA provides Jordanians with access to a wide variety of 
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IT products at low cost. This should help build up Jordan’s IT sector and other IT-
related sectors such as telecommunications.   
These tariff reductions did not require changes in Jordanian domestic law. The 
Customs Law of 1998 provides that goods entering Jordan are subject to customs 
duties as prescribed in the customs law. However, if there is a special provision for a 
tariff in an international agreement to which Jordan is a party, a tariff shall be imposed 
in accordance with the provisions of such agreement.23 Additionally, the Council of 
Ministers will issue decisions related to tariff changes.24 Regarding compliance with 
the WTO’s ITA, Jordan included its amended tariff schedule in its WTO accession 
agreements, thus negating the need to make changes in its domestic law and submit a 
separate modification document that indicates its compliance with the ITA. 
In total, Jordan made tariff concessions with regard to 2790 tariff lines for 
industrial products and 462 tariff lines for agricultural products.25 The imbalance of 
tariff concessions between industrial and agricultural products is due to Jordan’s 
emphasis on industrial products in international trade rather than on agricultural 
products. 
Jordan can use its tariff rates for several goals. For one, it can rely on tariff rates 
as bargaining leverage in future multilateral trade rounds. However, there is a 
potential pitfall for relying on tariffs as bargaining leverage in negotiations: as a result 
of several trade rounds, a large number of countries might lower their tariffs, thus 
depriving Jordan of its bargaining power.26 This is a scenario where the law of 
diminishing returns would apply to Jordan. A different goal would be for Jordan to 
rely on tariffs as a method by which to protect some domestic industries and raise 
revenue.27  
In approaching future rounds of trade negotiations, Jordan should argue in favour 
of a mathematical formula (linear cuts) in which the tariff rate applies across the board 
with lower tariff cuts per tariff line. The reason for favouring linear cuts is because of 
the nature of Jordan’s current tariff schedule. Close to 2131 tariff lines are above the 
20 percent tariff rate while about 7110 tariff lines are set below that percentage. 
Therefore, a harmonization formula, which applies for higher cuts on higher tariffs 
and lower cuts on lower tariffs, may not be desired. In addition, there is a need to 
exempt certain imported inputs from tariffs and other domestic taxes. The tariff 
exemptions would reduce production costs for domestic producers and give them 
much-needed competitiveness through cost savings. 
2. Agriculture  
The agriculture sector in Jordan has been a recipient of government subsidies.28 As a 
result of an economic crisis in the late 1980s, Jordan adopted a structural adjustment 
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program to reform the agriculture sector.29 In addition, Jordan passed a new law that 
would abolish the Agricultural Marketing Organization (AMO).30 This law dismantled 
the AMO authority over import and export sales.31 Additionally, Jordan abolished the 
system of fixed prices and allowed the private sector for the first time to import almost 
any agricultural product.32  
Jordan’s abolishing of the AMO and also of the Ministry of Supply were partially 
motivated by WTO accession. The policies of the AMO and the ministry may have 
violated article XVII of GATT 1994 or article 4 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture. However, these possible violations do not mean that the AMO or the 
Ministry of Supply themselves were invalid, but rather that their respective practices 
and policies may have been invalid. Rather than abolishing these entities, Jordan 
could have streamlined their operations by resolving internal disputes, removing 
stalemated bureaucracy and budget constraints, and changing their practices. 
Jordan has made several commitments to bring its agricultural practices in line 
with WTO rules. The country has eliminated quotas and other restrictive measures on 
imports of agricultural products.33 In addition, Jordan has committed itself to 
abolishing double inspection of carcasses.34 It has also agreed to reduce domestic 
support for agriculture, which previously amounted to JD1.5 million, to 13.3 percent 
over a seven-year period.35 Jordan does not have a history of export subsidies, since it 
does not have the money to support its domestic agricultural production or agricultural  
exports as do the United States and the EC.36 
WTO accession has led to the establishment of different bureaucracies in Jordan. 
Jordan’s current food safety and inspection network consists of several government 
agencies, including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Jordan 
Institute of Standards and Metrology.37 The establishment of the Jordan Food and 
Drug Administration, which is similar to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 
could lead to an overlap in inspection, a lack of coordination, and the deployment of 
different enforcement tools.38 It is unclear where the lines can be drawn between the 
jurisdictions of these various entities. The jurisdictional issues between these entities 
must be addressed through internal regulations. 
Issues that affect trade in food products include shelf life, i.e., how long a product 
can stay on the shelf, reclassification (chilled vs. frozen), and other requirements. U.S. 
exporters have often in the past cited short shelf-life standards in Jordan and other 
Arab countries as an important non-tariff barrier to trade in processed fruits and 
vegetables.39 Pre-existing shelf-life requirements in Jordan were considered 
inconsistent with the WTO agreements.40 For example, it had been the practice in 
Jordan that imported foodstuffs must have half their shelf life remaining at the time of 
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importation. This practice could amount to a restriction on the import of fresh food 
products because of the time required for processing, shipment, and customs 
clearance, which can take several days or weeks. Jordan has agreed to phase out the 
government-mandated shelf-life requirements for shelf-stable products.41 Therefore, 
Jordan would accept manufacturers’ use of their own “sell by” dates or open dating.42 
Jordan requires that the percentage of imported ewes or yearlings, i.e., female 
sheep of one to one and a half years of age, cannot exceed 10 percent of the total 
number of imported sheep. This age restriction was justified on the grounds that 
imported female sheep of old age are usually more prone to carrying diseases.43 A 
WTO member can challenge the age restriction unless it is proven that there is a 
scientific basis upon which to distinguish between female sheep imported under or at 
the age of one to one and a half years, and older female sheep. In other words, 
Jordan’s age restrictions claim must be scientifically supportable. Otherwise, the 
distinction could be considered arbitrary. 
In its accession negotiations, Jordan attempted to apply to have certain 
agricultural products such as olive oil, sheep, and poultry meat designated as eligible 
for special safeguards (SSGs).44 If Jordan had been able to designate those agricultural 
products as SSG eligible, the SSG provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
would have applied to them.45 However, Jordan was not able to achieve the SSG 
designation for olive oil, sheep, and poultry. Instead the decision was made that WTO 
working party members were to determine whether a product of an acceding country 
such as Jordan merited designation as SSG; it was not a designation that the country 
itself could make. Other WTO members were concerned that if Jordan were able to 
designate certain agricultural products as SSG, it would set a precedent for future 
acceding countries, who would request designating their own agricultural products as 
SSG. This would have created a situation unacceptable to members of the working 
party on Jordan’s accession to the WTO. 
3. Customs Law 
Customs laws and procedures are considered an important part of the trade system in 
Jordan. These laws and procedures regulate the flow of goods across the borders. One 
of the main functions of the Customs Department is the clearance of goods. Importers 
seeking to introduce goods into Jordan must file the appropriate documents and follow 
certain procedures and entry techniques. In some instances, traders have faced opaque 
procedures associated with customs transactions.46 For example, Jordan requires 
consularization or legalization of commercial bills by Jordanian consulates and 
chambers of commerce in the country of exportation for goods intended for export to  
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Jordan.47 Consularization or legalization of commercial bills may not be warranted, as 
it adds to traders’ costs and could be considered, in effect, a non-tariff trade barrier. 
Because of the WTO, the Customs Department of Jordan has been aggressively 
overhauling its customs procedures by upgrading its customs facilities and automating 
some aspects of the paper-based customs system. Moreover, the Customs Department 
has adopted many concepts and practices of trade facilitation. For example, the 
department provides green-lane treatment to companies through expedited shipments 
free of or with de minimis inspections upon arrival at ports of entry.48 Movement and 
clearance of imported articles is to be based on a risk-management system, which is 
essentially a methodical process for identifying high-risk shipments.49 The risk-
management system allows for the speedy clearance of low-value or low-volume 
imports. The risk-management system also allows for the speedy clearance of articles 
imported by a reliable company that has a long history of compliance with Customs 
Department rules. 
Although the adoption of risk-management techniques is a step in the right 
direction, it will take time and resources to truly activate these techniques. 
Additionally, since Jordan depends to a certain degree on tariffs, the role of the 
Customs Department would be devoted largely to collecting revenue for the Treasury. 
Customs officials may delay imported articles for hours or days while awaiting 
verification as to classification and valuation.50  
The Customs Department makes available customs-related laws, regulations, 
administrative rules, information on customs processes, conditions for importation, 
charges applicable under customs law, tariff rates, tariff classification opinions, and 
bilateral and regional trade agreements.51 The Customs Department provides advance 
rulings based on requests from traders who seek clarification on specific matters, such 
as classification and applicable tariff rates. Advance rulings prior to importation 
provide certainty and reduce delays. Advance rulings may also help small and 
medium-sized companies ascertain their respective risks before they enter into 
commercial transactions.  
4. Pre-shipment Inspection 
Jordan, in its protocol of accession to the WTO, indicated that it is a non-user of 
WTO Pre-shipment Inspection (PSI).52 However, Jordan agreed that if in the future it 
uses PSI services, it will comply with PSI.53 This would involve hiring PSI companies 
to carry out their activities in a non-discriminatory manner and ensuring that such 
inspections do not result in less favourable treatment for the inspected goods as 
compared to treatment of like domestic products.54 Furthermore, PSI services should 
take place in the exporting country or, if that is not possible, in the country where the 
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goods are manufactured.55 Moreover, Jordanian hired PSI companies would have to 
apply pre-shipment inspection services in a transparent manner.56 
No obvious reason exists to explain why Jordan is not a user of the PSI procedure. 
Pre-shipment inspection involves an inspection by a private firm in the country of 
export before exportation to Jordan.57 Such inspection would help alleviate some of 
the bottlenecks in customs procedures. It is possible that Jordan felt that its Customs 
Department and other government agencies have the administrative institutional 
capacity to undertake the same functions that PSI companies would undertake, and 
there have been few cases of corruption of customs officials or customs duty fraud. 
In 2003, Jordan contracted with Bureau Veritas/BIVAC International to conduct 
pre-shipment inspection and issue certificates of conformity for products that meet the 
required standards.58 Products subject to mandatory pre-shipment inspection include 
vehicles, electrical and electronic products, toys, and personal safety devices.59 Food 
products are subject to voluntary pre-shipment inspection. Pre-shipment inspection of 
these products had led to shipping delays.60 The pre-shipment inspection program 
operated by Bureau Veritas was terminated in August 2007. 
B. Market Access in Services  
Jordan has agreed to extensive liberalization undertakings under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); these undertakings would open some sectors 
that were previously closed or were restricted with regard to foreign investment and 
participation.61 Jordan has undertaken horizontal commitments with respect to the 
cross-border movement of individuals and commercial presence covering all types of 
services. For example, in cross-border movement of individuals, Jordan attached 
requirements related to duration of stay, pre-employment conditions, recognition of 
professional qualifications, economic and labour market needs tests, and work 
permits.62  
Jordan has made specific commitments in 11 major service sectors and 128 
subsectors and activities. For example, in the business sector, Jordan has agreed to 
eliminate restrictions on market access and national treatment in legal services in the 
four modes of supply.63 Thus, Jordan eliminated its rules, if any, that could restrict the 
rights of Jordanian and foreign lawyers to enter into partnerships or that could impose 
restrictions on the nationality of a foreign law firm. However, legal services of foreign 
law firms are limited to “advice” on “foreign law” only.64 As a result, a U.S. law firm 
can advise or consult on international or U.S. law, but it cannot advise clients on 
Jordanian domestic law.65 Other fields of legal services, such as domestic litigation, 
are not open to foreign lawyers.66 Only Jordanian lawyers are allowed to litigate or 
plead before Jordanian courts. Although at first glance it may seem that Jordan has 
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opened its legal service sector to foreign lawyers, closer scrutiny reveals that most 
legal activities remain off limits to foreign law firms.67 
Jordan has granted limited market access to foreign auditing firms.68 Auditing of 
financial records or verification reports of domestic companies by foreign auditors is 
restricted. Auditing must be performed by resident Jordanian auditors who pass 
qualification tests. Foreign accounting firms can, however, give opinions on company 
results, open representative offices in Jordan, or invest in joint ventures. These 
activities should help enhance transparency and improve accountancy standards. 
 Jordan has also made concessions in architectural, engineering, urban planning, 
and landscape architectural services by allowing up to a 50 percent ceiling on foreign 
shareholding.69 Foreign firms, however, are required to train and upgrade the technical 
and management skills of local employees. This seems to be an offset requirement for 
Jordan’s undertaking of commitments in these service areas. In the field of medical 
services and health care, Jordan has removed all foreign equity restrictions, which 
means that foreign-owned medical service providers can offer medical services 
without these restrictions.70 As a result, Jordan has a two-tiered health care system: the 
state-run medical system, provided through state-owned enterprises or directly by the 
state, and the private sector, which specializes in rich clients and high-end services. 
Jordan has provided market-opening commitments in telecommunication services 
by opening its government-controlled telecommunications system to unfettered 
competition and foreign telecommunications companies.71 In audio-visual and related 
delivery services, Jordan has made commitments regarding market access and national 
treatment in motion picture and videotape production services, motion picture 
projection services, and sound recordings.72 The country has, however, imposed 
foreign ownership restrictions and a nationality requirement for distribution services 
in this sector. It is unclear whether the commitments scheduled by Jordan in this sector 
cover radio and television services or not.  
Jordan has imposed several restrictions on distribution services, defined as 
commercial agency, wholesaling, retailing, and franchising services. Some of the 
restrictions include commercial presence requirements for cross-border trade, 
restrictions on the type of corporate entities that may be established, and foreign 
ownership restrictions.73 Despite these restrictions, foreign wholesalers and retailers, 
through joint ventures, may be able to establish outlets, chain stores, and wholesale 
operations in Jordan in which they may sell their goods. 
Jordan has removed and reduced obstacles to the transmission of educational 
services across its borders and the establishment of educational facilities including 
schools and offices.74 Thus Jordan has created favourable conditions for suppliers of 
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higher education and adult education services. Additionally, education consumers can 
purchase their education abroad. Jordan has hoped that education liberalization may 
help lure foreign universities into establishing branches in Jordan. It is my belief, 
however, that education in Jordan is and must be a government function. 
Liberalization of educational services should not erode the government’s ability to 
regulate education. Private education services ought to supplement, and not displace, 
public education. For example, private education could offer services that are not 
currently offered by government schools. Permitting private and public education to 
coexist in Jordan may help inject competition in the education system; but universities 
should not act like commercial firms rather than academic institutions. 
Jordan has also scheduled several commitments that cover areas such as life 
insurance services and other insurance services (e.g., transport, aviation, and accident 
insurance) and banking and other financial services (e.g., derivative trading and the 
provision and transfer of financial information).75 There are no limitations on the 
number of service suppliers in the form of quotas, exclusive providers, or economic 
needs tests, local currency lending restrictions, restrictions on geographical 
expansion, or capital requirements. Jordan has, however, imposed several other 
restrictions, such as the type of establishment allowed.76 Therefore, suppliers do not 
have the freedom to choose a preferred form of commercial presence, be it branch, 
subsidiary, or joint venture. Other restrictions include the level of equity participation 
and permitted business lines. Liberalization of financial services may allow suppliers 
to supply certain financial services on a cross-border basis in reinsurance and 
retrocession services, insurance intermediation services, and services auxiliary to the 
provision of insurance. 
Under article II of GATS, Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment means that 
measures should be applied to all service transactions without discrimination among 
countries. However, members are permitted to list MFN exemptions in the service 
sector. Jordan listed twelve MFN exemptions.77 Four of these are cross-sectoral 
exemptions related to movement of natural persons, for example to do with work 
permit fees, or related to investment, for example preferential measures and purchase 
of land. Eight of the exemptions are sector-specific exemptions. These sector-specific 
exemptions are related to professional services, audiovisual services, travel-related 
services, press services, and land-based transport services. 
Jordan made market-opening commitments across a whole range of services 
ranging from business and telecommunications to education and transportation. The 
coverage of the service sector is relatively complete. However, there are differences in 
terms of broad liberalization and full bindings in different service sectors. For 
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example, Jordan liberalized its education, telecommunications, and recreational 
services while it imposed limits on financial services, auditing services, and 
architectural and engineering services. Many of Jordan’s limitations on market access 
are in the form of residency limits, form of legal entity, foreign equity, and nationality.  
GATS provided some flexibility to Jordan in scheduling its commitments to 
liberalize trade in services. However, this flexibility may be challenged based on 
recent WTO dispute settlement cases such as Mexico’s telecom case and the U.S. 
gambling case.78 Jordan must take care, therefore, in scheduling future commitments. 
Alternatively, Jordan can liberalize its service sectors without such liberalization being 
written into its schedule of specific commitments. Moreover, Jordan could modify or 
withdraw some of its commitments under GATS, but if it were to do so other countries 
would seek compensatory trade concessions. Jordan is building a new economy based 
on knowledge-based industries. Trade in services may offer to Jordanian service 
providers, which are small and medium-sized businesses, great potential for 
opportunities. At the same time, liberalization of the service sector in Jordan could 
harm service firms, since they have weaknesses in resources, management, and know-
how. 
C. Protection of Intel lectual Property in Jordan 
 The intellectual property regime in Jordan proved to be a stumbling block for the 
country’s accession to the WTO. Jordan committed in its accession to the WTO that it 
would comply fully with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) from the date of accession, without recourse to 
any transitional period.79 The question of Jordan’s compliance has gained importance 
given the decision in 1999 by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to remove 
Jordan from its Special 301watch list.80 
Protection of well known marks in Jordan was an area where some reform was 
needed to ensure compliance with the obligation under TRIPs to protect such marks. 
Due to the lack of explicit provisions preventing the registration of well known marks, 
many local Jordanian companies filed applications to register well known marks in 
their own names.81 The simplistic approach to registering trademarks in Jordan 
contributed to the registration of hundreds of trademarks, most of which are well 
known. In addition, trademark rights were granted to the persons or entities that were 
the first to register in Jordan, without regard to prior use in Jordan or elsewhere. 
Many foreign owners of well known marks had to fight their way into Jordan 
because of registration by Jordanian persons or entities. For example, Shaheen 
International Corporation Co. filed an application to register the mark “PILLSBURY” 
in its name in Jordan.82 In another example, Hani Al-Qudsi & Partners, a Jordanian 
 Bashar H. Malkawi 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  
Company, filed a trademark application to register the mark “7ELEVEN” in class 16. 
In other cases, foreign owners of well known marks were unable to prevent 
registration of similar marks by Jordanian persons or entities. For example, a 
Jordanian company, Jordanian Trico & Yarn Factory Co., filed a trademark application 
for the “AL TIMSAH” mark (which means “crocodile” in Arabic) in class 32 similar 
to the application filed by La Chemise Lacoste, a French company. The registrar 
rejected Lacoste’s opposition to the registration of the “AL TIMSAH” mark on the 
basis that the two marks, AL TIMSAH and LACOSTE, were in different classes. 
Thus, there is no likelihood of confusion. 
It was not until 1999 that well known marks were expressly protected. The 
Trademarks Law of 1999 sets out special provisions to protect such marks. The law 
defines well known trademarks as marks that are widely known to the relevant public 
in Jordan and that enjoy a high international reputation.83 Therefore, in judging 
whether a mark is well known, one would consider whether the mark has surpassed 
the borders of its country of origin and whether the mark is well known to the relevant 
consumer segment in Jordan. Article 8.12 prohibits the registration of a trademark that 
constitutes a reproduction or translation, liable to create confusion, of a well known 
mark on identical or similar goods. Moreover, article 26.1 prohibits the use of a well 
known but unregistered trademark on dissimilar goods and services, provided that use 
of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the trademark, and provided that the 
interests of the owner of the trademark are likely to be damaged by such use. Thus, a 
well known mark may be defended even if it is not registered or the owner does not 
carry on a business in Jordan. However, it might be better to register such marks to 
avoid any dispute. 
Problems related to intellectual property protection in Jordan have also been acute 
in the pharmaceutical sector, where patented drugs were being manufactured without 
licence. The Patents and Designs Law of 1953 was deemed to be inadequate.84 This 
state of affairs led to patent infringements in the area of pharmaceuticals. Jordanian 
companies have applied for or registered 70 unauthorized copies of internationally 
patented pharmaceutical products, more than half of which are of U.S. origin. U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies lose between $25 and $50 million annually due to 
Jordanian pirate production, much of which is exported to other countries in the 
region.  
The change in Jordan’s Patents Law of 2001 permits the granting of patents for 
foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals.85 These provisions came into effect three years after 
Jordan became a WTO member. During that time, provision was made for securing a 
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filing date for applications for these types of inventions, but no action was taken until 
three years after WTO accession. Additionally, it was possible to obtain exclusive 
marketing rights during that period. Jordan’s Patent Law of 2001 bars domestic firms 
from copying patented drugs. Jordanian drug firms no longer are permitted to 
reproduce patented medicines simply by using a different process. In sum, 
pharmaceuticals, drugs, and agricultural chemicals, previously not patentable, are now 
patentable under the law. 
Having laws that comply with the TRIPs Agreement is only half the story. The 
second half is the enforcement of these laws. Effective enforcement of an intellectual 
property regime can increase confidence among foreign investors and businesses.86 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights in Jordan is an area affected by many 
factors. Enforcement is not cheap.87 It requires appropriation of millions of dollars, 
which would eat up a good portion of the annual budget of Jordan. Any action plan, be 
it raids, seizures, arrests, perp walks, or education campaigns, to reduce intellectual 
property rights infringement is constrained by limited financial resources and cultural 
and educational gaps. Additionally, if Jordan’s manufacturers desire to register their 
patents and trademarks abroad, such registration would require huge investment, 
which some of these enterprises lack. 
The Industrial Property Protection Directorate at the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade has 35 professional trademark and patent examiners, and support staff equipped 
with computers.88 Until recently, examiners were not required to be lawyers with 
intellectual property rights knowledge and expertise, have background in science and 
technology, or take a bar-like exam to do with patents. They have been more or less 
generalists. However, legal and scientific knowledge and experience can be acquired 
through on-the-job training. There is no special payment system for examiners. The 
budget allotted for the directorate, which is derived in part from patent and trademark 
fees, is part of the ministry’s budget. On the other hand, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office is totally funded by and dependent on fee income such as patent 
statutory fees, issue fees, public search fees, and certified copy fees. 
The problem of piracy or counterfeiting in Jordan is a problem of small and 
medium-sized companies, who produce these products to gain profit, and/or crime 
syndicates. Among all products that could be subject to violations, such as movies, 
computer software, clothing, pharmaceuticals, and counterfeited luxury handbags, 
music is most significant.89 Although officials at the National Library in Jordan, as 
part of enforcement of intellectual property rights, may seize or impose fines on 
pirated CDs, DVDs, production equipment for same, or warehouses used to store 
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those pirated products, it is unclear to what extent there have been instances where 
such products or equipment have been destroyed.  
There are political and cultural factors that contribute to the difficulties associated 
with enforcement of intellectual property rights in Jordan. There is a sentiment among 
many Jordanians that religiously based law is a necessary bulwark against 
Westernization and the domination of Western culture.90 There is mistrust among 
Middle Eastern countries of the West. This mistrust is based on many years of 
experience, especially during colonialism. 
D. Commitments of Jordan in Relation to Transparency 
The concept of transparency is a core component of the WTO. Article X of GATT 
1994, which is based to a large extent on the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act, 
forms the basis for commitments on publication of laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, administrative rulings, and trade agreements. Moreover, article X requires 
the administration of laws, regulations, and administrative and judicial decisions that 
affect international trade in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner.  
The purpose of article X of GATT 1994 is to ensure predictability in an open 
multilateral trading system, as it embraces the rule of law. The rule of law, siyadat al-
qanun in Arabic, means authority would be exercised in a fixed and predictable way, 
rather than based on unlimited personal discretion. In other words, rule of law means 
that the government would act according to a set of rules promulgated in advance. 
Rule of law is a necessary foundation for free trade and economic development. It 
undercuts corruption and cronyism. Absence of rule of law discourages investment 
and commerce. Therefore, free trade and rule of law not only are linked but also ought 
to be used interchangeably.  
Jordan has committed in its accession to the WTO to publish all laws, regulations, 
and judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application as they pertain 
to international trade.91 Currently, there are three journals that publish laws, 
regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions.92 In some instances, laws, 
regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions could be published in daily 
newspapers.93 
The administration of laws, regulations, and administrative decisions affecting 
international trade in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner could prove 
difficult in Jordan. Discrepancies in the interpretation and application of laws and 
regulations involve several factors. Areas of jurisdiction among agencies and 
ministries may overlap. Moreover, some laws and regulations are drafted in such a 
way as to leave some terms ambiguous. Authorities could exploit ambiguity to 
implement laws and regulations as they see fit. 
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The circumstances and the level of development of the legal system in Jordan 
affect the rule of law. The constitution may not be considered a living legal 
document.94 Usually, laws emanate from the executive authority, which has extensive 
control over the drafting of laws.95 Judge-made law does not exist in Jordan; therefore, 
judges do not make public policy statements. Additionally, Jordan needs to revise and 
improve the legal profession, which includes more than 8,000 lawyers, some of whom 
are poorly trained and underpaid. 
Publication of laws and regulations, though important, is not enough. Consistent 
and fair application of existing laws and regulations is of utmost importance. 
Transparency and rule of law commitments will improve the trading system in Jordan. 
Moreover, transparency and rule of law are effective modes by which to limit 
government abuses that would disrupt trade. 
E. Other Selected Commitments 
The WTO working party accession report for Jordan covers, among other areas, fiscal 
and monetary policy, foreign exchange and payments, privatization, and price 
policies.96 Price rationalization and privatization policies are not explicitly covered in 
the WTO agreements. Moreover, Jordan undertook commitments in trading and 
distribution rights.97 Trading and distribution rights allow private Jordanian and 
foreign companies to import, export, set up after-sale networks, and sell goods 
throughout Jordan.98 These trading rights will enable U.S. companies to import and 
export goods without using Jordanian trading companies. Distribution services will 
allow U.S. companies to sell their goods without establishing joint ventures with 
Jordanian companies. 
Jordan committed itself to observe the requirements of article XVII of GATT 
1994 that govern state trading enterprises.99 Currently, there are five state trading 
enterprises that have the exclusive right to import or export.100 These state trading 
enterprises must observe the conditions stipulated in article XVII of GATT 1994 in 
their purchases or sales. For example, purchases by state trading enterprises must be 
conducted in a non-discriminatory way, be based on commercial considerations, and 
afford enterprises of other countries the opportunity to compete in such purchases or 
sales based on customary business practice. 
Jordan agreed in its accession protocol to the WTO that it would request observer 
status under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).101 Moreover, 
Jordan confirmed that upon accession to the WTO it would initiate negotiations for 
membership in the GPA.102 It also confirmed that, if the results of the negotiations 
were satisfactory to the interests of Jordan and the other members of the agreement, it 
would complete negotiations for membership within a year of accession. However, 
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Jordan is not a member of the GPA yet, and it has yet to offer a detailed plan or 
timetable. 
In its accession to the GPA, Jordan will weigh the possible benefits to its 
budgetary efficiency and its industries as a result of opening its government 
procurement sector to foreign competition. First, the share of Jordan’s industries in the 
government procurement market of other countries is negligible. Moreover, Jordan’s 
industries lack experience in competing in contract tendering. Therefore, the benefits 
from joining the GPA are marginal. U.S. companies are not interested in the small 
Jordanian government procurement market. Rather, U.S. companies are interested in 
major projects that are worth billions of dollars, such as the Kansai airport in Japan, or 
valuable procurement markets such as that of Hong Kong. A further consideration is 
that in acceding to the GPA Jordan would have to modify its current practices, which 
give preference to domestic suppliers of goods and services.103 Jordan acceded to the 
WTO multilateral agreements, which are considered the most important step, and thus 
there is little interest in joining the GPA. 
The 2008 Trade Policy Review of Jordan 
One result of the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations was the creation of the trade 
policy review. The trade policy review exists because member countries need to know 
about the conditions of trade in a particular country. The objectives of the trade policy 
review include facilitating the smooth functioning of the multilateral trading system 
by enhancing the transparency of WTO members’ trade policies.104 In other words, 
such reviews serve as forums for achieving transparency. The frequency of these 
reviews with regard to a particular country depends on that member’s share of world 
trade.105 
WTO members had the chance to examine Jordan’s trade policies and practices 
through the trade policy review of Jordan in 2008. The review presented a challenge 
for local authorities because of the volume of documentation and information needed 
to draft a national report.106 The scope was wide, since all of the sectors covered by 
WTO agreements came under review.107 The review examined every national policy 
adopted by Jordan, checking them for compatibility. The review gave a picture of the 
Jordanian economy in the pre-WTO period and focused on the reforms being 
implemented in accordance with Jordan’s WTO commitments. 
In the trade policy review, trading partners of Jordan and the WTO Secretariat 
praised Jordan’s progress on trade liberalization. This liberalization has resulted in 
real GDP growth of 5.9 percent and relatively low inflation of 3.1 percent, on average, 
per year during the period from 2000 to 2007.108 The economic reforms have also 
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contributed to reducing public debt from 98.4 percent of GDP in 2002 to 60.3 percent 
at the end of March 2008 and to increasing the average annual inflow of foreign direct 
investment from US$155 million during the period 1990-2000 to US$3,121 million in 
2006.109 According to the 2008 review, Jordan modified a number of its policies by 
reforming its customs laws and practices, modifying its TRIPS legislation, and 
reforming its telecommunications and financial services.110 In sum, Jordanian 
practices are becoming increasingly WTO-compatible. However, the WTO Secretariat 
took note of certain matters and aired concerns over certain issues. 
The 2008 review was critical on three points: (1) administrative hurdles that 
inhibit the business environment; (2) limitations on foreign participation in certain 
service sectors such as transportation, construction, and distribution; and (3) tariff and 
non-tariff barriers (tariff escalation) to trade and a complex incentives regime.111 The 
review notes that Jordan must continue its reforms by dismantling the remaining 
restrictions on tariff and investment barriers and diminishing procedural hassles. 
The 2008 trade policy review of Jordan has been successful in highlighting WTO 
incompatibilities. The review can put pressure on the Jordanian government to 
undertake further reform and follow-up exercises. 
Conclusion 
Jordan’s accession to the WTO was a lengthy and costly process. Jordan did not 
accede to the trade body until other WTO members were satisfied the country had 
made sufficient concessions. The terms and conditions for accession were easier prior 
to the creation of the WTO.112 Jordan agreed to reduce tariffs, open its service market, 
and accede to the ITA. Jordan enjoyed special and differential treatment in few areas. 
For example, Jordan was granted an adjustment period to cope with the 
implementation of tariffs reduction, but was not granted transitional periods for the 
implementation of its service commitments and customs valuation. Moreover, Jordan 
was not able to designate olive oil as a special safeguard good. Other WTO members 
did not grant Jordan special and differential treatment, so as not to set a “bad” 
precedent for other acceding countries and in order to maintain the “integrity” of the 
WTO system by not creating a two-tiered system for developed and developing 
countries. In its accession to the WTO, Jordan turned from an applicant to a 
supplicant. 
The degree of open market commitments Jordan undertook in its accession to the 
WTO was the culmination of several factors, which included domestic policy-making 
debates, lobbying by interest groups, and pressure from foreign governments such as 
the United States, the EC, Australia, and Switzerland. Generally, countries acceding to 
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the WTO are required to make changes to their laws and regulations prior to joining 
the trade body. Jordan met some of its commitments at the time it joined the WTO. In 
addition, Jordan committed to meet other requirements after its accession. Therefore, 
Jordan should meet many of its commitments in the post-accession period. 
The WTO agreements required fundamental changes in the domestic laws and 
regulations of Jordan. For example, nearly100 laws were newly created or 
fundamentally changed.113 Many of the laws promulgated were provisional and 
adopted in haste prior to the 1999 self-imposed deadline for accession to the WTO. In 
the months ahead, the National Assembly must approve the laws and regulations in 
order to honour Jordan’s commitments. However, the National Assembly, for the sake 
of proving that it is not a rubber-stamp assembly and to ensure good legislative 
practices, may strike down or modify these laws and regulations in a degree less 
consistent with Jordan’s obligations under the WTO. There are many layers of 
ministries and administrative agencies entrusted with implementing these laws and 
regulations, and the enforcement of them largely depends upon the discretion of these 
ministries and agencies. 
Many areas of implementation of the WTO agreements require heavy 
administrative and financial investment. For example, reform of the customs law and 
practices requires the introduction of new laws, the creation of administrative bodies, 
the training of staff, and the establishment of buildings and purchase of equipment, all 
of which will cost millions of dollars. However, financial aid from international 
donors and technical assistance from the WTO can alleviate the difficulty of 
implementing Jordan’s commitments. 
The government of Jordan must introduce policies aimed at cushioning the most 
vulnerable groups from the effects of trade liberalization. These policies include re-
employment projects, diversified education, and funds to offset the extreme adverse 
effects of trade liberalization. Alternative sources of revenue must be developed, 
including establishment of an effective system of value-added and sales taxes. 
Jordan will compete in the international market on the basis of the rule of 
comparative advantage. Many products that Jordan cannot produce it can purchase 
from other countries, and vice versa. The process of trade liberalization could inject 
new dynamism into the stagnant industry sector. Moreover, the process of trade 
liberalization will create winners and losers. Jordan’s membership in the WTO is only 
ten years old and the country is still in the pipeline of liberalization. Since this 
researcher is not a futurologist, it is up to the coming years to show whether the 
optimist’s position or the pessimist’s position on Jordan’s accession to the WTO has 
credence. 
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Endnotes 
                                                     
1.  Bashar H. Malkawi holds an S.J.D. in International Trade Law from the American 
University, Washington College of Law, and an L.L.M. in International Trade 
Law from the University of Arizona. The author is extremely grateful to Professor 
David Gantz of the University of Arizona and to Padideh Alai of American 
University for sharing their feedback and comments with him on the topic of this 
article. 
2.  Of the 153 current members of the WTO, only twelve are Arab countries. Algeria, 
Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority, Somalia, the Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen have all lined up for accession to the WTO. See Daniel Pruzin, 
U.S. Blocks Iranian WTO Application; Syria Prevented from Placement on 
Agenda, 19 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 36 (Jan. 3, 2002) (stating that Syria’s request 
for membership in the WTO was blocked because of Syria’s backing for the Arab 
League trade boycott of Israel). See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Discuss 
Accession of Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq Explores Membership Process, 20 Intl. Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 2079 (Dec. 18, 2003). See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Agree 
to Begin Work on Libya Accession Request, 21 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 2195 (July 
29, 2004). 
3.  See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature October 30, 
1947, 61 Statute A3, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1700, 55 
United Nations Treaty Series 187, arts. XXXIII & XXVI.  
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4.  See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession, 15 
American University International Law Review 1469, 1476 (2000).  
5.  The article XXVI.5 (c) procedure does not require a series of bilateral concession 
agreements, decision of the contracting parties, or protocol of accession. Rather, 
the customs territory or newly independent country obtains membership on the 
same terms and conditions as those that had been accepted by its former colonial 
master on its behalf. Under GATT article XXVI.5 (c) and procedures adopted 
during a 1957 GATT meeting, there is a period of de facto application of GATT 
obligations on a reciprocal basis between the contracting parties and the customs 
territory or newly independent country. During that period, the new country can 
adjust to the obligations, implement necessary trade policies, and decide whether it 
desires full GATT membership. An affirmative decision leads to full membership 
after a prescribed reasonable period. Id. at 1477.   
6.  For example, Bahrain (1993), Djibouti (1994), Kuwait (1963), Mauritania (1963), 
Qatar (1994), and United Arab Emirates (1994) entered into the GATT through the 
sponsorship procedure. On the other hand, Egypt (1970), Morocco (1987), and 
Tunisia (1990) joined the GATT through the full accession process. Arab countries 
that were contracting parties in the GATT automatically became members of the 
WTO once they ratified the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.  
7.  A non-market economy is an economy where enterprises make decisions not on the 
basis of economic factors, but rather on the basis government directives. The 
purpose of article XVII is to regulate the market behavior of state trading 
enterprises. However, the drafters of the GATT maintained flexibility in article 
XVII so that it can apply to state trading countries and not only to state trading 
enterprises. See Anna Lanoszka, The World Trade Organization Accession 
Process, Negotiating Participation in a Globalizing Economy, 35 Journal of World 
Trade 575, 579 (2001). 
8.   Article XII of the WTO Charter provides that any state or customs territory 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations may 
accede to the WTO on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. 
9.   Usually, a country applies for membership in the WTO after enjoying the status of 
observer. As an observer, a country can attend WTO meetings and participate in 
discussion. However, the country may not participate in the decision-making 
process. Some meetings may be confidential, and thus an observer country may be 
excluded from such meetings. The observer country must apply for membership 
within five years of becoming an observer. Id. 
10. The applicant submits a trade policy memorandum that describes its foreign trade 
policies and administrative systems that may have bearing on the WTO 
agreements. The memorandum is a fact-providing document that includes relevant 
statistical data, laws and regulations, the current tariff schedule, domestic support 
measures and export subsidies in agriculture set in a specific pattern and tabular 
format, and policies that affect trade in services. This memorandum establishes 
the basis for negotiations between the applicant and the working party. Id. at 591-
593.    
11.The protocol of accession represents the terms of entry into the WTO. The protocol 
outlines the applicant’s current trade laws and policies, while noting the 
differences between that regime and the minimum WTO requirements. The 
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protocol explains how and when the applicant intends to correct these differences. 
The final package for accession includes the working party report, the protocol of 
accession, and the annexed schedules of the applicant’s commitments. The 
Ministerial Conference, or the General Council in cases where the Ministerial 
Conference is not in session, makes a decision by two-thirds majority on the 
accession report. If a two-thirds majority favours the accession, the applicant may 
sign the protocol and join the WTO. 
12.Consumers in Jordan benefit from trade liberalization by purchasing many 
commodities. Cars represent a case in point. Private car ownership, from 
affordable compact cars to high-end cars, is ubiquitous. Mobile phones, among 
several other popular electronic devices, are another hot commodity. See Special 
Report: Telecoms, 48 Middle East Economic Digest, 26 (No. 15, Apr. 9, 2004).    
13.The working party held five meetings, starting in October 1996. See Working Party 
Report, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, 
WT/ACC/JOR/33, paragraph 2 (Dec. 3, 1999). Originally, the working party 
consisted of 20 members, headed by K. Kesavapany, Singapore’s WTO 
ambassador and former chairman of the WTO General Council. As the number can 
change at any time during negotiations, the working party on Jordan’s accession 
first grew from 20 to 27 members, and then from 27 to 33. Those 33 members 
usually have been the exporting countries that have interest in the Jordanian 
market. For example, the working party on Jordan’s accession included members 
as diverse as Argentina, Australia, Morocco, Switzerland, India, the United States, 
Canada, and the EC. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Membership 
and Terms of Reference, WT/ACC/JOR/5 (Nov. 1, 1996).  
14. Jordan Cleared to Join WTO: Removed from Watch List, No. 22 Middle East 
Executive Report 8 (1999) (page references not available). The Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) removed Jordan from the watch list (WL) in an out-
of-cycle review. The USTR publishes lists of countries with various levels of 
intellectual property concerns: priority foreign country (PFC), priority WL 
country, WL country, and under observation. “Priority WL country” is one notch 
under “PFC”, countries which undergo investigation that could lead to trade 
sanctions.    
15. The real reasons for the impasse at the Seattle meeting consisted of multiple 
factors. Before the Seattle meeting, it took WTO members almost a year to select 
the new Director-General of the WTO, agreeing at the end that Mike Moore first 
would assume the post for three years (non-renewable), followed by Supachai for 
another three years (non-renewable). Developing countries pleaded their plight in 
implementing the results of the Uruguay Round, but neither did developed 
countries listen nor did the Appellate Body of the WTO pay heed in its 
interpretation of special and differential rules for developing countries. Further, 
there was a mood of tension even among developed countries themselves, a mood 
exaggerated by the Beef-Hormone case, the Banana case, and negotiations on 
agricultural trade. At the Seattle meeting the USTR adopted the “green room 
model”, whereby negotiations were limited to some 30 countries while others 
were excluded; these others felt they were being marginalized. For more see Dilip 
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K. Das, Debacle at Seattle: The Way the Cookie Crumbled, 34 Journal of World 
Trade 5, 181-201 (2000).      
16. Jordan ratified the WTO accession package in March 2000. Jordan’s working 
party report to the WTO is 114 pages long. See WTO Director-General, Protocol 
of Accession of Jordan: Notification of Acceptance and Entry into Force, 
WT/Let/333 (Mar. 14, 2000). 
17. See WTO, Goods Schedule of Jordan, Staging Annex, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/jordan_e.htm> (Dec. 3, 1999). 
18. Jordan exerted tremendous efforts in convincing WTO members that further tariff 
cuts would damage its fragile economy in 1998 with a mounting trade deficit. 
However, those efforts did not bear fruit.  
19. Specific duties, as opposed to ad valorem duties, are not transparent and have the 
effect of increasing trade protectionism. Jordan agreed to impose zero or very low 
tariffs on all chemical products in light of the Chemical Tariff Harmonization 
Agreement of the Uruguay Round.  
20. Bound tariff rates are the maximum tariffs Jordan can apply under its WTO 
commitments. Applied tariff rates are the actual tariffs in place.  
21. Jordan has a ten-year transition period for implementing tariff reduction 
commitments. Rather than outright prohibition on imports of tobacco and alcohol, 
Jordan opted to impose higher prohibitive tariffs between 150 percent and 200 
percent. Thus, tobacco and alcohol maintain high tariff peaks. See Daniel Pruzin, 
WTO Approves Accession of Jordan to Trade Body, 17 Intl. Trade Rep. 29 
(BNA) (Jan. 6, 2000). See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of 
Jordan, supra note 12, at paragraph 55. 
22. The ITA provides for the elimination of tariffs on a wide range of some 180 
information technology products in five major categories: computers and 
peripheral devices, semiconductors, printed circuit boards, telecommunications 
equipment (except satellites), and software. Developed countries had until Jan. 1, 
2000 to phase out tariffs, while developing countries were given extended 
deadlines to eliminate tariffs on certain products deemed sensitive. The ITA takes 
account of the rapid pace of development in information technologies by 
establishing procedures for consultations on, and review of, product coverage, as 
well as non-tariff measures that might impede market access for information 
technology products. See Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Peter S. Jordan, Timothy C. 
Bightbill, International Trade, 32 International Lawyer 319, 323-324 (1998). 
23. See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, art. 9, Official Gazette No. 4305 (Oct. 1, 1998). 
24. Id. art. 14. 
25. See WTO, Goods Schedule of Jordan, Staging Annex, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/jordan_e.htm> (Dec. 3, 1999).  
26. See Edward John Ray, The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-tariff Barriers, 8 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 285, 295 (1987).  
27. See Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yoram Margalioth, Taxation in Developing 
Countries: Some Recent Support and Challenges to the Conventional View, 27 
Virginia Tax Review 1, 12 (2007).  
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28. In the wheat sector, the government bought wheat production from producers at 
prices higher than international wheat prices. Jordan also has a history of 
subsidizing agricultural inputs such as water, electricity, and credit. Farmers could 
obtain loans either from the Agriculture Credit Corporation (ACC) or from 
commercial banks. However, since the ACC provides loans at an interest rate 
below that of commercial banks, many farmers have borrowed from the ACC. 
The average interest rate on loans given by the ACC is below that of commercial 
banks by 3.5 to 5.5 percent. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, 
Introduction to Jordan’s Agriculture Sector and Agricultural Policies, 
WT/ACC/JOR/14, at 14-17 (July 1, 1998). 
29. In 1996, Jordan adopted the agricultural policy charter. One objective of the 
charter, among other goals, is to maximize the role of the private sector in 
agriculture and limit the government role to the provision of institutional support 
such as research and infrastructure investments. Id. 16. 
30. See Provisional Law on the Cancellation of the Agricultural Marketing 
Organization No. 22, of 2002 (May 16, 2002). 
31. The AMO set the quantities and types of agricultural products to be imported or 
exported and the dates of importing or exporting. For example, prior to 1998 the 
AMO was responsible for determining imports on a monthly and quarterly basis. 
The AMO also participated in determining the prices of agricultural products. See 
Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Introduction to Jordan’s Agriculture 
Sector and Agricultural Policies, WT/ACC/JOR/14, at 21 (July 1, 1998). 
32. Under earlier practices, the Ministry of Supply had exclusive rights in wheat 
imports and brand distribution of Halibuna, a type of dried milk. The Ministry of 
Supply also fixed the prices of essential foods such as bread, sugar, and rice. 
33. During 1994-1996, Jordan imposed quotas on imports of olive oil and chicken 
meat. 
34. The practice in Jordan was to inspect imported meat at the border as well as after 
it cleared customs. Some WTO members argued that such a practice appears to be 
more trade restrictive than necessary. The representative of Jordan confirmed that, 
as of the date of accession, unnecessary inspections of imported meat products 
would be eliminated and national treatment would be accorded fully to such 
products. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 
12, at 147, 149.  
35. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
189. See also Notification from Jordan, Domestic Support of Jordan, 
G/AG/N/JOR/1 (Sep. 17, 2002). 
36. See Ann Saccomano, Free but with a Price, Journal of Commerce 13, 14 (Dec. 9, 
2002) (citing that the U.S. farm bill provides for a subsidy of $180 billion to 
farmers over the next ten years). For more on the U.S. agricultural policy see J.W. 
Looney et al., Agricultural Law: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing Farm Clients 
5-10, 191-205 (1990). (Many of the U.S. support programs date back to the farm 
financial crises of the 1930s and 1980s. Certain factors may provide an 
explanation for the divergent treatment of agriculture in the United States. First, 
farming is viewed as a unique way of life dependent on natural forces that are 
 Bashar H. Malkawi 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  
                                                                                                                                            
beyond the farmer’s control. Farmers also are viewed as a stabilizing element in 
society because of their vital role in food and fibre production. Farmland is a 
major source of aesthetically and psychologically pleasing open space and a 
locale for many non-farm recreational activities. Farmers are a distinct minority in 
the United States, where they constitute about 2 percent of the total population. 
Finally, their lack of participation beyond the production stage of agriculture is a 
contributing factor to their inability to attain adequate income.) 
37. The new Law on Food Control stipulates that the Ministry of Health is the sole 
authority responsible for food safety for imported as well as domestically 
processed products. See Provisional Law on Food Control No. 79 of 2001, art. 3, 
Official Gazette No. 4522 (Dec. 13, 2001). 
38. See Michael S. Schumann et al., Food Safety Law 2, 8-11 (1997). (This work 
explains that an ongoing problem in the United States involves the division of 
responsibility between the two primary agencies: the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), which oversees meat and poultry inspection and regulations, 
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which oversees almost all other 
food products. The arrangement is not quite as simple as it sounds. For example, 
the two organizations share jurisdiction for egg products. Under the USDA, food 
products must be pre-approved prior to marketing. Food products under FDA’s 
jurisdiction can be marketed without pre-approval and are subject only to post-
marketing surveillance and enforcement. The USDA has the major labeling 
requirements for food while the FDA’s requirements generally refer to artificial 
flavouring, colouring, and chemical preservatives, as well as saccharin.) 
 39. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Processed Foods and Beverages: A 
Description of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers for Major Products and Their 
Impact on Trade, Inv. No. 332-421, Pub. No. 3455 (Oct. 2001). (In some Middle 
Eastern countries, processed fruit and vegetable products are given a shelf life of 
12 months, without regard to the packaging technology used, and must have 50 
percent of their shelf life remaining upon entry into the country. However, many 
of these products are produced once a year from fresh products harvested in 
season and distributed from inventory. Shelf-life restrictions prevent the year-
round distribution of these products.)   
40. Shelf-life requirements were based on Jordan’s Standard Number 288/1994 for 
foodstuffs and Standard Number 401/1997 for infant and children’s foodstuffs, 
specifically. The working party on Jordan’s accession stated that such 
requirements do not have a sound scientific justification. See Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 144. Jordan can 
impose restrictions on imports of food for safety reasons but not for quality 
concerns. Generally, shelf-life standards function as quality indications.  
41. “Shelf stable” refers to an otherwise perishable product that has been altered so it 
can safely be stored in a sealed container for an extended length of time. In its 
WTO accession, Jordan confirmed that it would eliminate shelf-stable products 
from the coverage of these standards by June 30, 2000. See id. at 145. Jordan’s 
move to processors’ dates from the government-mandated shelf-life standards 
would be accomplished without an interim period over a short period of time 
ending in 2000.   
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42. In the United States, product dating is not required by the federal government 
except for poultry, infant formula, and baby food. Dates are applied by either the 
manufacturer or the store. The terms used for dating are flexible since there are no 
standards. For example, “best by” is a quality and flavour assurance date. It does 
not mean that the food is unsafe after that date. This kind of date is often placed 
on cereals. The term “sell by” is an indication for the retailer to pull the product 
off the shelf by that date. The term “packaged date” refers to the date on which a 
food such as meat was packaged or processed. It is not an indication of safety. 
“Expiration date” refers to the date by which food must be used or eaten. “Born 
on” refers to the freshest beer and “coded date” refers to letters or numbers that 
allow the manufacturer to track food. See The Dating Game, Consumer Report 9 
(Mar. 2004).  
43. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
176. 
44. Even after Jordan acceded to the WTO, Jordan argued for the SSG designation for 
olive oil, sheep, and poultry meat. See Proposal by Jordan, WTO Negotiations on 
Agriculture, G/AG/NG/W/140 (Mar. 22, 2001) (page references are not 
available). 
45. Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is a special safeguard article for 
agricultural products. In order to apply this special safeguard provision, any non-
tariff measure imposed on the imported agricultural product in question must be 
converted into tariff. Additionally, the agricultural product must be designated as 
SSG. Moreover, there are two conditions, the presence of either one of which is 
sufficient to trigger the special safeguard. First, the volume of imported 
agricultural product has to exceed a trigger level. Second, the price of imported 
agricultural product must fall below the trigger price in the base period (1986-
1990). If the first condition is satisfied, then an additional duty will be applied for 
the rest of the year in question (the additional duty may not exceed 33.3 percent of 
the ordinary tariff in effect the year the action is taken). If the second criterion is 
met, then additional duty will be imposed on a shipment-by-shipment basis. 
Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is a special provision: it does not 
require a serious injury test, the safeguard measure takes the form of additional 
duty only, and no retaliation is allowed. This is contrary to the WTO Safeguards 
Agreement, which requires an injury test, allows that a safeguard measure could 
be in the form of tariff or quota, and provides that there can be retaliation. In order 
to obtain SSG status, an acceding country has to convert non-tariff trade measures 
into tariffs. Jordan did not convert non-tariff trade measures into tariffs as 
required under article 4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, a condition that is 
vital for applying an SSG measure. Rather, Jordan set tariffs on agricultural 
imports at lower levels and bound them.  
46. See Pete W. Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic 
Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait 162, 166 (2004). (Some traders are concerned about 
the increase in the size and power of the Customs Department. Those traders 
claim that bureaucratic problems with the department are legion. Sometimes, 
completing a customs importation document requires seventeen signatures.) 
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47. Jordan committed to phase out consularization of commercial bills by December 
31, 2002. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 
12, at 72. Jordan has yet to rectify the practice of consularization in line with this 
commitment. For example, as of 2009, the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, 
D.C. requires legalization of commercial bills and charges $84 per document as a 
legalization fee. Commercial bills must also be legalized by the National U.S.-
Arab Chamber of Commerce.  
48. See Jordan Customs Department, Selectivity in the ASYCUDA System, available 
at  
< http://www.customs.gov.jo/ publication.asp> (accessed February 4, 2009). 
49. See Customs Law No. 20 of 1998, supra note 22, art. 84. The idea of inspecting all 
imported articles is impractical and a poor use of limited resources. A risk-
management system limits the physical inspection of imported articles. This 
system includes random sampling at different rates. The system starts with the 
Customs Department when goods are imported and continues through inspection. 
All information related to goods is to enter into a computerized system that would 
enable later retrieval by inspectors.   
50. Until there is further lowering of tariffs, there could be mistrust between customs 
officials and importers regarding smuggling and under-valuation for the purpose 
of evading payment of tariffs.  
51. The information is available at the Customs Department website, with English 
translation. See <http://www.customs.gov.jo>.   
52. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
102. 
53. Id. 103.  
54. See WTO Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, articles 2.1 & 2.  
55. Id. article 2.3. 
56. Id. article 2.5. The WTO established a London-based entity to deal with disputes 
arising from pre-shipment inspections. 
57. PSI companies check the shipment details of goods purchased abroad such as 
price, quantity, and quality in order to ensure that tariffs are fully paid on the 
goods.  
58.From 2003, Jordan operated the International Product Conformity Certification 
Program, called Daman. The program was implemented by Bureau Veritas on 
behalf of the Jordanian Institution of Standards and Metrology. Imported goods 
were tested and certified in the country of origin, while domestic products were 
tested and certified at the site of manufacture. 
59. Id. 
60. On several occasions Jordanian companies have claimed that Bureau Veritas has 
not been adhering to standard requirements and its activities have become 
obstacles to international trade. Jordanian companies have voiced specific 
complaints about what they see as unwarranted demands and unnecessary delays 
in clearing shipments. 
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61. The detailed undertakings of Jordan for trade in services are included in a 39-page 
report. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Jordan, WT/ACC/JOR/33 (December 3, 1999). 
62. Id. pages 3-6 (paragraph references not available). 
63. Id. page 5. The four modes of supply are cross-border supply, consumption 
abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons.  
64. Id. page 6. 
65. A foreign law firm can advise or represent Jordan in its accession to the WTO, 
since this falls under international law, but it cannot advise or represent regarding 
domestic family law in Jordan. 
66. Id. 
67. Jordan permitted foreign law firms to advise on foreign law only, in order to 
preserve the integrity of the legal profession in Jordan by prohibiting the entry of 
unqualified foreign lawyers and to protect the domestic legal bar against global 
law firms. See International Trade in the 21st Century 227-228 (Khosrow Fatemi 
ed., 1997). (The United States leads the world by a wide margin on both the total 
number of lawyers and the proportion of lawyers per million. It is also very 
interesting, or perhaps frightening, to further note that 35 percent of the lawyers in 
the world in 1992 lived, and presumably practised law in, the United States.)  
68. See Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 6. 
69. Id. 7. 
70. Id. 8, 25. 
71. Jordan’s commitments cover basic services, which include mobile and wireline 
voice and data services, local and long distance domestic telephony, mobile radio 
(cellular, paging, and personal communications services), international 
telecommunications, satellite services, private leasing services, and network 
carrier and network access business and value-added services, defined as email, 
voice mail, online information database storage and retrieval, online data 
processing, internet access service, internet content service, and 
videoconferencing services. Id. 13-16.  
72. Id. 16. 
73. Id. 18. 
74. Id. 18-19. 
75. Id. 20-25. 
76. Id. 20. 
77. Id. 36-39. The twelve MFN exemptions apply indefinitely. Therefore, Jordan may 
not need to phase out these exemptions. However, in future trade negotiation 
rounds, Jordan could eliminate MFN exemptions.   
78. See Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004). See also Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).   
79. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
230. Despite several attempts by Jordanian officials and negotiators, Jordan was 
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not given a transition period to comply with its TRIPs obligations. The United 
States and the EC held firmly to their no-transition positions by arguing that every 
acceding country must comply with TRIPs immediately upon accession.   
80. Jordan had been on the U.S. watch list for quite some time, as the United States 
watched closely Jordan’s intellectual property regime. The situation worsened 
when there was discussion in 1998 on whether Jordan would be targeted with 
trade sanctions under Special 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act for failing to adequately protect U.S. copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks. 
81. See Amir H. Khoury, The Development of Modern Trademark Legislation and 
Protection in Arab Countries of the Middle East, 16 Transnational Lawyer 249, 
269 (2003). 
82. Id. 321.  
83. See Trademarks Law No. 34 of 1999, arts. 7, 7.1, 4 & 12 Official Gazette No. 
4389 (Nov. 1, 1999). 
84. See 1997 Special 301 Report, available at <http:// www.ustr.gov/pdf/special.pdf> 
(April 30, 1997) (citing the shortcomings of the patents law regarding 
pharmaceuticals). 
85. See Provisional Patents Law No. 71 of 2001, Official Gazette No. 4520, art. 36.a 
(December 2, 2001).  
86. See Suha Ma’ayeh, Improved IPR Enforcement Gets Mixed Reviews, Jordan 
Times 10 (May 10, 2001). 
87. See Patents and the Poor, Economist 22 (June 23, 2001). (The cost for a poor 
country to build just a bare-bones infrastructure to implement TRIPS is roughly 
$1.5-2 million. WIPO gives technical assistance to countries trying to draft 
intellectual property legislation or set up their patent offices.)   
88. See Report on Industrial Property Protection, Directorate of Ministry of Industry 
and Trade 3 (2009) (on file with the author). This number constitutes a fraction of 
the some 7,000 employees at the USPTO. However, this is understandable since 
the U.S. patent system has been in existence since 1790. 
89. See Copyright Infringements Referred to Courts, Jordan Times 5 (Nov. 14, 2003). 
90. See John Carroll, Intellectual Property Rights in the Middle East: A Cultural 
Perspective, 11 Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal 555, 574 (2001). 
91. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
239. 
92. These are the Official Gazette, the Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association, and 
the Judicial Journal. The Department of the Official Gazette in the Prime Ministry 
publishes the Official Gazette, and the Ministry of Finance distributes it. The 
Jordanian Bar Association issues the Journal of the Jordanian Bar Association, 
which covers final judicial decisions of the Court of Cassation and the High Court 
of Justice, news of the Bar Association, and selected research. The Judicial 
Institute of Jordan publishes the Judicial Journal, which covers decisions of the 
Court of Cassation and the High Court of Justice. 
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93. See, for example, Draft Law Implementing the Free Trade Agreement between 
Jordan and the U.S., Al-Rai, 27 (February 28, 2001). See also Draft Law on 
Arbitration of 2001, Ad-Dustour, 5 (June 23, 2001).  
94. Constitutions in Arab countries are symbols of independence, enacted on the eve 
of independence or the prospect of independence. Constitutions serve the purpose 
of organizing state authority, especially in succession. See Nathan J. Brown, 
Constitution in a Nonconstitutional World 35, 49, 61-63 (2002). 
95. See Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and 
the Gulf 57 (1997). 
96. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 9-
32. A price-control system is designed to ensure the poor can afford basic 
commodities and to prevent prices from skyrocketing. In the past, the government 
of Jordan determined a fair price for dozens of essential goods and services in 
intricate detail. The list of goods included meat and flour. 
97. Id. at 50. 
98. Under Jordan’s trading rights regime, foreign equity in Jordanian trading 
companies is limited to 50 percent. Jordan committed to permit foreign companies 
to exercise trading rights without limitation on foreign equity or capital. Id. at 45. 
99. Id. 161. 
100. These state trading enterprises are Jordan Tanning Company, Jordan Petroleum 
Refinery Company, Jordan Cement Factories Company, Jordan Phosphate Mining 
Company, and Vegetable Oil Industries. 
101. Id. 169. The GPA, signed by some two dozen countries, applies only to those 
countries that are members of the WTO Agreement. The GPA applies to contracts 
for purchasing goods and services worth more than $175,000 for central 
government procurement tenders and about $270,000 for contracts with provincial 
and state authorities. The GPA contains substantial and procedural obligations. In 
terms of the substantial obligations, members of the GPA are required to extend 
the Most-Favoured Nation and national treatment rules to goods and services of 
other members. The procedural obligations included in the GPA are related to 
transparency through the publication of notices inviting tenders and post-award 
notices, and establishing an independent review body to consider complaints by 
domestic or foreign suppliers related to any violation of the agreement. See Amol 
Mehra, Federalism and International Trade: The Intersection of the World Trade 
Organization’s Government Procurement Act and State “Buy Local” Legislation, 
4 Brigham Young University International Law & Management Review 179, 180-
183 (2008).  
102. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, supra note 12, at 
170. Currently, Jordan is in the process of accession to the GPA. See Daniel 
Pruzin, China Submits Modest Offer to Open Government Procurement Market, 
25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 116 (January 24, 2008). (Seven other WTO members – 
Albania, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Oman, Panama, and Taiwan – are also 
negotiating their accession terms to the GPA.) 
103. These practices are tied to industrial, political, and social policies that are 
difficult to modify.  
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104. See Jai S. Mah, Reflections on the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in the World 
Trade Organization, 31 Journal of World Trade, 49, 49-51 (1997). 
105. Generally, the four members with the largest shares of world trade (currently the 
EC, the United States, Japan, and Canada) are reviewed every two years, the next 
sixteen members are reviewed every four years, and others are reviewed every six 
years. A longer period may be fixed for least-developed members. 
106. As part of the trade policy review, two documents are always prepared: a report 
by the government under review, which constitutes the basis of discussion, and a 
report written by the WTO Secretariat independently. See Jordan Completes 
WTO First Review of its Trade Policy, Jordan Times (November 13, 2008). (The 
Ministry of Industry and Trade in Jordan had been preparing and cooperating with 
the WTO since the beginning of 2008 to conduct the review. Jordan provided 
answers to over 160 inquiries by WTO members.)  
107. Four main sectors were reviewed: agriculture; mining, energy, and water; 
manufacturing; and services. See Report by the WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy 
Review: Jordan, WT/TPR/S/206, pages 59-94 (October 6, 2008).   
108. Id. page vii.  
109. Id. pages 3 & 8.  
110. Id. pages 12, 54-58, 83.   
111. Id. pages 19, 26-31, 41, 47-49, 59, 88.     
112. See Doha Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paragraph 9 (Nov. 14, 2001). (“We [WTO members] also 
welcome the accession as new members, since our last session, of Albania, 
Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova and Oman, and note the extensive 
market-access commitments already made by these countries on accession.” 
[emphasis added]) 
113. See Nail-Biting: Jordan’s Fairly Fair Election, Economist 38 (June 21, 2003). 
(Some 160 laws have been promulgated, which some say are good for promoting 
a program of economic liberalization in the absence of the parliament.) 
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